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The implicit ethics of designing 
 
Abstract 
The relationship between ethics and design is most usually thought of in terms of applied 
ethics. There are, however, difficulties with this: for instance, conventional ethical stances 
such as deontology or consequentialism depend on procedures (predefined rules, 
optimisation) that are inapplicable in the sorts of complex situations which designers 
commonly face. In any case, it is not as if ethics is a settled body of theory that can act as 
an authority with which to guide practice. Depending on which theories we refer to, we 
receive different, and often directly conflicting, guidance. Paralleling the idea that design 
has its own epistemological foundations, rather than needing to import ideas from science, 
I propose an alternative way to think of the relation between design and ethics, looking to 
(1) the ethical questioning implicit in what designers do, and (2) the similarities between 
those situations which they encounter as a matter of course and those questions with which 
normative ethics is both most concerned and confused. I suggest that we might reason 
about ethical questions in design in design’s own terms and, also, that rather than apply 
ethical theory to design we explore what design can contribute to ethics, inverting the more 
usual hierarchy. 
 
Design and ethics 
The relationship between ethics and design is most usually thought of in terms of applied 
ethics—as the application of normative ethical theories to design practice, for instance in 
terms of questions about agency, professional ethics or our relationship to technology or 
the environment. There are, however, difficulties with this. Firstly, as with any instance of 
applying theories to design that are external to it, what is special about design itself can 
become obscured. Secondly, it implies that ethical considerations are external to design 
questions, a view that can lead to seeing ethics as conflicting with design, either as an 
amelioration of design ideas or a radical innovation. In any case, it is not as if ethics is a 
settled body of theory that can be straightforwardly treated as an authority with which to 
guide practice: depending which theories or ideas we refer to, we receive different, and 
often directly conflicting, guidance as to what to do. 
There are parallels between this and the relationship between design and science. 
With the exhaustion of the attempt to provide a rational basis for design through the 
application of the scientific method, usually referred to as the Design Methods Movement, 
Nigel Cross, John Naughton and David Walker (1981) argued that, given what they 
identified as a state of epistemological chaos in science at that time (following critiques 
such as those of Paul Feyerabend, 1975/1993), scientific method was not a fruitful basis for 
design. Similarly, while we may wish to treat ethical philosophy as authoritative, it is 
unstable as a point of reference. As Terry Eagleton (2003, p. 229) has noted, we might 
expect to agree on general principles and diverge on particulars, yet we have no common 
view on many everyday ethical questions. Even with those questions where we have 
widespread agreement over an action being ethically good or bad, there is little agreement 
on why this is the case. Whether this state of disagreement is understood as a conflict 
between objective goods (Berlin, 1958/1998), an inevitable property of our subjectivity 
(Sartre, 1948) or as resulting from the dissipation of any overall idea of the good life with 
which to make different goods commensurable (MacIntyre, 1981/1985), the situation in 
which we find ourselves is that anything to which we refer to help clarify an ethical 




question is itself contestable. 
In this paper I explore an alternative way to think of the relation between design 
and ethics,  one  that  avoids  applying  ethical  theory  to  design  practice  but  instead  
looks    to recognise the ethical questioning implicit in what designers do. This approach is 
suggested by the way that, in response to the difficulties in referring to science as a 
paradigm for design  that I noted above, design theorists such as Cross (1982) and Bruce 
Archer (1979) put  forward the idea that we understand design as having its own 
epistemological foundations as  a discipline. A particularly strong version of this argument 
was presented by Ranulph Glanville (1981/2014, 1999), who argued not just that design be 
understood as having its own foundations independent of those of science, but, reversing 
the usual hierarchy, that scientific research was itself a specially restricted form of design. 
Paralleling the idea that design has its own epistemological foundations, I suggest 
that there are ethical considerations at the core of what designers do, even when they are 
not explicitly addressing ethical issues, and that, accordingly, we can reason about ethical 
questions in design in design’s own terms. Further, just as Glanville argued that an 
understanding of design might inform science, making these connections opens up the 
possibility that reflection on design might also inform ethics, reversing their more usual 
relationship. 
There are two avenues of investigation that I put forward here: firstly, regarding the 
sorts of situations with which designers are concerned, which are similar to questions of 
central concern in ethics not just in terms of content but also structure; and, secondly, 
regarding the ways in which designers explore these situations, which implicitly involve 
ethical questioning. 
 
Wicked problems and ethical dilemmas 
One way of characterising the situations that designers typically encounter is as what 
design theorist Horst Rittel and planner Melvin Webber called “wicked problems” (Rittel, 
1972; Rittel & Webber, 1973, 1984). Unlike the well defined problems that they refer to as 
“tame”, wicked problems have no right answers, no stopping rule and no immediate or 
ultimate test because of their conflicting, incomplete and changeable requirements. They 
cannot, therefore, be overcome through the sort of linear problem solving advocated by the 
Design Methods Movement. 
Underlying each of the features that Rittel and Webber describe is the way that 
design is always concerned with creating the new. It follows that it is not possible to fully 
analyse the situation in advance or to definitively frame the problem at hand because new 
questions, and with them new criteria, emerge in the process as the situation is explored. 
While Rittel went on to develop particular participatory responses to such situations, 
wicked problems have since come to be seen as characterising those situations with which 
designers deal as a matter of course, often without regarding them as being problematic 
(e.g. Glanville, 2011). It is with such situations that design claims disciplinary expertise. 
Rittel and Webber’s original account of wicked problems was concerned with 
ethical issues, regarding how we design for others. (Note, though, that the wickedness of 
wicked problems is not meant to imply any ethical wickedness but, rather, complexity). 
This ethical aspect is part of their difficulty: unlike science, where falsification is an 
integral and acknowledged part of the process of research, designers have “no right to be 
wrong” (Rittel & Webber, 1973, p. 166) because of the significant impact their actions 
have on others. This leaves designers in a bind: they have no way to be right, yet no right 
to be wrong. There is a sense, then, that when designers grapple with wicked problems, as 
they do as a matter of course, they are dealing with at least some difficult ethical questions 
(although here I leave open the question of how well they do this). 




As well as this connection to ethics in terms of content, there is also one in terms of 
structure. Wicked problems resemble those ethical dilemmas with which normative ethics 
is both most concerned and confused. That is, not only do wicked problems involve 
ethical dilemmas but, also, ethical dilemmas are wicked problems. This is not to say that 
all ethical questions are wicked but that with tame questions in ethics being easily solvable, 
it is with the wicked ones, those that present us with dilemmas, that we look to normative 
ethical theories for guidance. Similarly to wicked problems in design, the dilemmas that 
form common examples in ethical theory typically involve conflicting or incomplete 
premises such that what action to take is contestable. Alasdair MacIntyre (1981/1985, pp. 
6-7), for instance, describes a series of familiar contemporary debates, which are 
characterised by the clash of contradictory positions following from premises that are, in 
themselves, reasonable but which are incompatible with each other. It might be countered 
that the contestability of such situations may be resolved through one theory or another. 
For instance, we might make the conflicting premises commensurable with each other, 
either through some form of consequentialist calculus, such as in utilitarianism, or through 
a unified conception of the purpose of human life, such as proposed by MacIntyre. 
Alternatively, we might apply moral rules discerned from rational thought or divine 
revelation. However, the plurality of ways to “tame” (using Rittel and Webber’s term) 
ethical dilemmas is part of their underlying wickedness. We may have many ways in 
which to come to definite answers to ethical questions but whichever way we choose leads 
to quite different answers and we have no way to choose between these different 
approaches. As with wicked problems, the “choice of explanation determines the nature of 
the problem’s resolution” (Rittel & Webber, 1973, p. 166): different normative ethical 
theories lead to different characterisations of the same situation and so different proposals 
for how to act. 
Given that wicked problems have no right answers, the idea that ethical dilemmas 
are wicked is a challenge to the very idea of normative ethics, which seeks to give us 
definitive standards to guide action. While it could be argued that this is only a quality of 
situations as we encounter them, and that normative ethics deals with questions of what is 
right in principle rather than practically what to do in some particular situation, the idea of 
what is good conduct must refer to an action that it is possible to take in a situation as we 
find it. To separate ethical theory from the actuality of circumstance assumes an 
unworkable objectivity akin to the sorts of linear design methods that, as Rittel and 
Webber describe, could only work given an implausibly complete description of the 
situation. 
Indeed, neither of the two most commonly articulated positions in normative ethics, 
consequentialism and deontology, can in principle guide us with wicked problems (and 
even if it is argued that the incommensurability of many ethical dilemmas is circumstantial 
and could be clarified, at least some ethical problems, those designers face, are wicked). 
The reasons for this mirror the limitations of the attempt to rationalise design according to 
the scientific method, as have been made evident, for instance, in the research of Nicholas 
Negroponte’s Architecture Machine Group, whose work raises similar points to those put 
forward contemporaneously by Rittel and Webber. Consequentialist ethical theories 
involve the optimisation of our actions against a predefined overall goal yet, as Negroponte 
(1975) has pointed out, optimisation is “extremely antagonistic to the nature of 
architecture” (p. 189). Likewise, while deontological approaches to ethics require that we 
conform to predefined moral rules, “any axiom or rule can find a situation where it will fail 
or generate disaster when blindly executed as a truism” (p. 33). Where, as in the situations 
in which designers typically work, there is no clearly defined goal or problem, it is not 
clear which rules to apply or which goal to seek. 





Implicit ethical questioning in design and conversation 
While wicked problems seem intractable when viewed in terms of logical reasoning, they 
are characteristic of the situations that designers encounter and deal with as a matter of 
course, to the extent that from a designer’s perspective it is difficult to see what the fuss 
is about. For instance, that a problem is not understood until after the formulation of a 
solution is to be expected in design. As Lawson (1979) has shown, designers explore the 
situations for which they design through the making of proposals rather than through 
analysis. In this way they avoid difficulties with problem definition at the outset, 
redefining the scope and aims of the project in process. 
Of central importance to how designers navigate wicked problems is the interactive 
way in which they work, which can be thought of as a conversation which they hold with 
themselves and with others, often through making drawings and models (see for example 
Gedenryd, 1998; Glanville, 2007; Schön, 1983/1991). While this can be thought of as 
occurring at various scales across the design process, it is best exemplified in the 
characteristic design activity of sketching where marks are simultaneously made and 
reinterpreted, paralleling the way that in a conversation we continually turn between 
speaking and listening. Just as a face-to-face conversation cannot be defined in advance but 
evolves and changes course as it develops, so too designers use the conversational structure 
of the way they work to develop new and often unforeseen ideas, redefining their 
understanding of the situation for which they design as they work. 
While this is most obviously an epistemologically activity—a way of grappling 
with the complex situations that designers encounter—it is also one in which, as in 
conversational interaction more generally, a degree of ethical consideration is, at least 
potentially, implicit (these connections are in part suggested by a cybernetic account of 
epistemology, an understanding that invites analogies with both design and ethics; see 
Sweeting, 2015a). There are different aspects of this, one of which, and that on which I 
focus on here, is the way that the consideration of others is an integral part of how 
designers work (other aspects include responsibility and purpose; see Kenniff and 
Sweeting, 2014; Sweeting, 2014, 2015b). While this consideration of others by designers is 
partly manifest in attempts at participation, such as for instance consultation with 
stakeholders, it is also part of the conversations that designers hold with themselves. Just as 
a conversation involves us looking “through the eyes of the other” (to use a phrase that 
cybernetician Heinz von Foerster (1991) attributed to Victor Frankl), so too designers use 
drawings to “walk through” their proposals from the point of view of those they are 
designing for, many of whom, such as the future users of a building or its passers by, they 
will not be able to meet, let alone consult. In this way, even designers’ dialogue with 
themselves, such as through drawing, can be understood as a participatory activity, 
involving ethical considerations, as well as an epistemological or practical one. Mirroring 
this, the conversations that designers hold with other stakeholders, whether through 
standard forms of consultation or more ambitious participatory design techniques, are not 
solely attempts to involve others for ethical reasons but part of how designers learn about 
the situation in which they act and the significance of what they propose. That is, while 
participation with others is often viewed as either an amelioration of design or an addition 
to it, its inclusion within the design process, in whatever form, is not solely for ethical 
reasons (involving others in what will affect them) but as part of designers’ thinking, 
analogous to the conversations they hold with themselves via drawing. 
 
Conclusion 
Whereas ethical considerations are often thought of as external to or even as in conflict 




with design, the conversational way in which designers work intertwines the ethical and 
participatory with the practical and epistemological. Comparing the case of drawing to that 
of participatory design, we can distinguish genuine dialogue from monologue in both cases 
and contrast the participatory quality of the dialogue that designers conduct with 
themselves with the often monological nature of supposedly participatory consultation. 
This is not to say that design always incorporates others or considers ethical questions 
either successfully or genuinely. Yet, it is significant that such considerations are not 
external limitations on design, as is implied when the relationship between ethics and 
design is understood in terms of the application of normative ethical theory to practice. The 
consideration of others, the example I have taken here, is an integral part of what designers 
do, even when they are not explicitly considering ethical issues. It is, therefore, possible to 
explore at least some ethical questions in the context of design in design’s own terms. 
Furthermore, the parallels between the structure of wicked problems and that  of 
ethical dilemmas, which I have noted above, suggest that the way designers work has 
significance for ethics beyond just design’s specific context. The two most commonly 
articulated positions in normative ethics, consequentialism and deontology, cannot guide 
us in the context of wicked problems. They depend on procedures (optimisation, 
predefined rules) that are unworkable in such situations, which are characterised by 
shifting goals and missing information. Given this, the way in which designers approach 
wicked problems is, I suggest, also relevant to ethics more generally. Indeed, we can look 
to design to inform ethics, reversing the more usual hierarchy, as those dilemmas that are 
of central concern in ethics are similar in structure to the situations that designers 
commonly encounter. Rather than understanding the relationship between ethics and 
design in terms of the application of the former to the latter, a relationship where in any 
case one receives conflicting advice depending which theories one refers to, we can look to 
design as an example of a way of acting, applicable in complex and ethically charged 
situations, in which ethical considerations are implicit. 
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